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Abstract
The end of literature: reflections on literature and ethics
Metaphysical scepticism and historical consciousness have 
sharpened our awareness o f  the limitations o f  language and rational 
discourse. This emphasis in critical theory offers a challenge to the 
Christian literary critic. Reflection on the nature and importance o f  
teleology provides a way o f  refocusing criticism on the centrality o f  
ethics rather than on truth claims in the study o f  literature. Using 
Ricoeur as a counter to the scepticism o f  Derrida, Christian literary 
theory can fin d  a way to situate itse lf in the postmodern world. By 
understanding teleology in the context o f  narrative theory, as 
opposed to the contexts o f  eschatology and utopia, Christian theory 
can fin d  a way o f  recovering the place o f  religion and ethics in 
literary criticism.
1. Definitions: Teleology, eschatology, utopia
In this essay I will be reflecting on the teleology o f  literature from the vantage 
point o f the Christian tradition. Before I develop my main thesis, it will be
1 Reworked version of a paper originally presented at the International Conference 
on “Christianity and literature at the turn of the twentieth century” -  
Potchefstroom, August 1995.
2 Full-time professor in Department of English, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, 
USA.
Koers 61(1) 1996:3-20 3
The end o f literature: Reflections on literature and ethics
helpful to clarify my use o f the term teleology. First, teleology does not require 
an Aristotelian conception o f  an ideal or universal telos or end or goal. It does 
not even require that the telos be a certain or determinate good. It does imply, 
however, that living in time entails some sense o f  purposeful movement toward 
desired goals. As Jeffrey Stout (1988:237) writes in Ethics after Babel, the 
telos or end need not be “a fixed conception o f  the good, derived once and for 
all from a philosophical view o f the human essence”; “the telos that matters is 
one actually achievable under our social-historical circumstances by acceptable 
means” (Stout, 1988:226).
Second, teleology should not be identified with eschatology conceived of 
narrowly as a view or theory o f  the the nature o f life and society in the “end 
times,” that is, after the end history as human beings experience and know it. 
The Christian belief in the “hereafter” does not provide in culturally specific 
terms the teleological goals o f  human beings living in history. The nature of 
the “afterlife” is only obscurely suggested even in Scripture, and although the 
images o f heaven that are given in Scripture may be an important source for 
reflection on human life in the here and now, the images o f  the hereafter 
provide no programmatic blueprints for constructing historical societies. 
Understood in a broader sense, however, as theological interpretation o f  the 
moral and social implications o f biblical teachings about the future, eschatology 
is close to, if  not identical with, teleology. Conceived in this way, as, for 
example, in M oltmann’s Theology o f  Hope, eschatology is o f great importance 
for Christian understanding o f  social and historical life. Moltmann (1967:16) 
writes,
From first to last, and not merely in epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is 
hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing 
and transforming the present. The eschatological is not one element o f  
Christianity, but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which 
everything in it is s e t ...
Third, teleology is not to be confused with utopian thinking. As Paul Ricoeur 
(1986:16, 310-14) points out in his Lectures on ldeologr  and Utopia, utopian 
reflection is an essential part o f  our living in history. But while utopian visions 
or models o f  ideal societies are useful and even necessary for teleological 
thinking, teleology encompasses much more than utopian projections. 
Utopian thinking imagines a future society that is relatively complete and 
coherent in its social institutions, whereas teleology pertains to any and every 
action in time, whether actual or imagined. As David Carr (1986:39) observes, 
“In a significant sense, when we are absorbed in an action the focus  or direction 
o f  our attention, the center o f  our concern, lies not in the present but in the 
future Every action has a goal whether or not it projects or implies a
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utopian end. For Christian thinking in particular, it is important to distinguish 
the closely related concepts o f eschatology, utopia, and teleology. The 
Christian concept o f the afterlife offers no detailed program for a Christian 
utopia, and neither concept encompasses all o f the problems o f teleological 
thinking about the historically and culturally specific actions that daily engage 
all human beings.
Thus, the notion o f teleology that I want to use is a general and historicized one 
that is related to but not identical with the concepts o f  eschatology and utopia. 
This use o f the term -  the concern for future possibilities that attend all o f our 
actions -  will draw our attention to the historical character o f human 
understanding, and that will enable us to see more clearly the scope and aim of 
literary criticism and the contours of a Christian perspective on criticism. Our 
contemporary theoretical environment makes it necessary for Christian critics 
as well as other critics to acknowledge in new ways the temporal and historical 
contingencies o f  human experience and understanding.
2. Truths and actions
Traditionally, Christian criticism has tended to concentrate on the importance 
o f transhistorical dimensions o f truth more than the historical limits o f  under­
standing. When pressed to speak about the ultimate value o f literature, 
Christians tend to appeal to the notion o f universal truths that enrich life 
because these truths transcend historical limitations. Literature gains its 
enduring value from such truths, the argument goes, and thus great literature 
enables us to transcend our social and historical particularity. In contrast to 
this notion, I want to explore the view that the primary end o f literature is not 
the expression o f universal truths or the representation o f universal moral 
values. Though universal truths and values may be important for the study of 
literature, the primary purpose o f literature is not to convey or represent such 
truths or values but to explore the possibilities and consequences o f specific 
human actions and thoughts in a narrative situation. Whatever we may mean 
by universal truths and values in literature, they are qualities that serve the end 
o f  literature and are not themselves the end. The end is the narration o f actions 
that have ethical significance. While we as readers cannot apprehend the 
ethical significance o f  actions without cognitive analysis and understanding, the 
literature itself aims to explore by narrative means the moral dynamics of 
human action and does not have as its primary aim the direct statement o f the 
cognitive truths that may be implied by the narrative. Actions that are narrated 
in literature are often taken as illustrations o f universal truths and values rather 
than as what they are -  the uncertain and often stumbling efforts o f characters 
to find a way to act in a confusing world. Literature dramatizes for us the 
teleological searching o f  people who are faced with conflicts and choices. Even
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if  a literary work in the end implies the affirmation o f some truth or value, the 
narrative focuses our interest on the dynamics o f  the quest rather than on the 
implied truth or value. It is the teleological searching for meaning and 
direction more than the reaffirmation o f familiar universal values that interests 
us in literary narratives.
The question o f truth in the arts, however, is not one to pass over lightly. The 
notion that literature offers instruction as well as delight has continued to be an 
important topic in literary discussions since Plato and Aristotle placed it in the 
forefront o f literary theory. Instruction and delight have been defined and 
interpreted in many different ways, o f course, and in our century the concept of 
instruction has become a particularly controversial one because o f increasing 
scepticism about whether anyone can speak about truth in the traditional sense 
o f  absolute rational certainty. In an era in which Cartesian doubt leads to more 
doubt rather than to certainty, what happens to definitions o f  truth? Anti- 
foundationalism has pretty much carried the day among contemporary 
philosophers and cultural theorists, and it has left us with new questions about 
the nature and significance o f truth. And if  truth in philosophy has had a great 
fall, how can we speak o f  truth in the arts and literature?
Perhaps Christians tend to be more persistent than others in clinging to 
traditional ideas about the importance o f truth in literature because concern 
about truth has always been so central in Christianity. After all, don’t 
Christians begin with the belief that Christianity is true? And if  Christianity is 
true, does not everything else follow from that? Do twentieth-century 
Christians have to abandon their concern with truth because o f  postmodern 
scepticism? I do not wish to obscure the importance o f truth claims for 
Christians, but I do wish to refocus the lenses, to see in a contemporaneous way 
how truth fits into the total enterprise o f literary criticism. If the concern with 
truth assists in our understanding o f  literature but is not the primary end of 
literary study, then we need to alter the angle o f  vision appropriately.
My objection to putting truth at the centre o f our concerns or making universal 
truth the primary end o f  literary criticism is that our conception o f  truth as a 
universal or transhistorical standard tends to make us underestimate the 
historical nature o f  understanding. A fully transhistorical stance is possible 
only for the deity; for human beings understanding is always conditioned by 
finite and historical limitations. The concept o f  truth in literature is an 
important concept, but we must also take into account the conditions that 
history imposes on human understanding o f  truth. A historicized conception of 
teleology may help us to see these conditions more clearly.
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Let me try to illustrate the implications o f this point with two examples, the 
first one taken from the realm o f ethics. If I take the commandment “Thou 
shalt not kill” and then on that basis alone condemn a person for killing 
another person, I am adopting a nonhistorical, nonteleological view o f moral 
value. I am not considering why the killing took place or for what purpose it 
was perpetrated. And if  I judge in a purely abstract way that a given action is 
contrary to the law, I am also adopting a nonbiblical view, for the Bible often 
allows for killing even while it holds to the commandment forbidding killing. 
Killing in warfare, in capital punishment, and in self-defense are biblically 
condoned forms o f killing, and killing in these circumstances has generally 
been considered not to be contrary to the sixth commandment. Judgments 
about justifiable and unjustifiable killing can be discerned only if  we take into 
account the context o f  particular historical circumstances, and our under­
standing o f these circumstances cannot be made without the notion o f teleology.
A second example is more directly related to the issue o f  truth as doctrine. The 
notion o f the sinfulness or fallenness o f human beings is one o f  the cardinal 
truths o f  Christianity. But it is also clear that this truth and its implications 
have been construed in diverse ways. In the Reformed tradition, for instance, 
much intellectual energy has been spent on questions about the consequences of 
the fall: are all natural human actions totally sinful or partially sinful? Are 
human beings by nature totally incapable o f good or are they inclined to both 
good and evil? What is the relationship between sin and grace? Is there 
common grace as well as saving grace, and if  so, to what extent does common 
grace affect the fallen nature o f human beings? The complexity o f  the 
distinctions and arguments over such issues often baffles the minds of 
nontheologians, particularly since advocates o f  all positions claim to be 
explicating fundamental biblical truths. Difficulties in explaining doctrinal 
principles occur because such explanations are always made in response to 
particular historical and cultural issues that require interpretation. Our under­
standing o f  truth is coloured by the occasions that motivate our search for the 
truth and the ends for which we use it. Our judgments are never divorced from 
pragmatic ends and consequences. Teleology places us in the thick o f  our 
historical and cultural situations.
If  Christian interpretations o f  truth, like all other interpretations, are influenced 
by historical and cultural situations, the relationship between literature and 
truth can be construed as an interactive one. We may look at literature in the 
light o f  truth, but literature also may make us reexamine and even adjust or 
refine our understanding o f  truth. And that complicates Christian criticism and 
theory considerably. It forces Christians to abandon rationalistic Archimedean 
assumptions about truth and to adopt a more open and historically realistic
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stance. Truth is always in the process o f  being interpreted, and while we do 
examine literature in the light o f  our present understanding o f truth, we also 
seek to find in literature ways in which we can develop and enhance our 
understanding o f  truth.
If we adopt this interactive model o f  literature and truth, we also, I think, are 
better able to see that the aim o f literature is not first o f all to convey truth in 
the sense o f universal unchanging principles. Literature may imply or even 
give allegiance to certain universal truths or principles, but literature is 
essentially story; and since stories are made up o f actions, they aim to dramatize 
moral conflicts and choices rather than to convey universal truths. The focus of 
literature is on moral action more than on conceptual systems; literature focuses 
on ethics more than on truth claims. That is the primary thesis that I want to 
explore.
3. Teleology in contemporary literary theory: Derrida 
and Ricoeur
The need to rethink Christian literary criticism is in large part occasioned by 
current movements in literary theory. Much o f the burden o f this theory is that 
literary criticism must be taken out o f  the ivory tower and must address the 
issues o f authority and freedom, o f identity and community, o f race, class, and 
gender. From the viewpoint o f most contemporary critics, a literary criticism 
that focuses its attention on the search for universal truths and values is out of 
touch with the cultural and intellectual crosscurrents o f  our age. Behind much 
o f contemporary literary theory is a call for ethics, a call for the understanding 
o f the moral implications o f  reading. A Christian approach to literature must 
also address social and moral issues.
To develop my thesis about literature and ethics, I begin with a very general 
point: the ultimate purpose or end o f  Christian faith is the expression o f that 
faith in Christian living, individually and communally. That, o f course, entails 
many other things since living takes place only through social practices and 
institutions. Thus, the development o f a theology, or the formation o f social 
and political institutions, or the establishment o f  ecclesiastical forms of 
governance are important tasks within Christianity. All o f  these tasks, 
however, serve the ultimate goal o f  cultivating in Christian believers the 
practice o f  Christian living. Nicholas W olterstorff (1989:53) writes, explaining 
the rationale for advocating a certain curricular model for college education, 
“the ultimate goal o f  Christian collegiate education [is] a Christian life, not just 
Christian thought”. If  that is the goal o f  Christian faith in general, then the 
reading and study o f literature, like all other enterprises, should ultimately, for 
Christians at least, serve the purpose o f  developing the Christian life, however
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that purpose is explicated. Only if  this larger goal is kept in mind can 
Christian critics maintain proper perspective on more specific problems in 
literary theory and criticism.
I f  the ultimate goal is the living o f a Christian life, then Christian critics will be 
concerned in the final analysis with ethical issues, ethical in the broad sense of 
having to do with the nature and dynamics o f  human actions. Their concern 
ultimately is with the question o f  how literature affects or contributes to the 
goal o f  Christian living. John Crowe Ransom (1991:476) put his finger on the 
pulse o f much o f  mid-century thinking when he said that “Art is post-ethical” 
and that literary criticism should concern itself with aesthetic matters rather 
than ethical ones. The opposite is the case today: we need to rethink how 
aesthetic criticism contributes to our understanding o f  broader ethical concerns.
The issues pertinent to ethical criticism are numerous, and I want to digress for 
a moment to acknowledge this complexity. Here are six interrelated issues that 
I glean primarily from the writings o f  Stanley Hauerwas, a prominent American 
voice in the area o f Christian ethics. In Resident Aliens (1989) Hauerwas 
emphasizes the importance o f the biblical basis for Christian ethics, o f the need 
for stories that explore the issues o f  life in narrative form, the nurturing 
influences o f  a Christian community, the need for a vital tradition, the 
beneficial effects o f  exemplary models o f moral living, and finally a strong 
teleological view o f history. All o f these points would be important in a full 
Christian theory, but it is only the last o f these topics -  teleology -  that I am 
focusing on in this essay.
To see more flilly the implications o f teleological thinking for literary criticism, 
we will take a brief look at the viewpoints o f  Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur. 
Ricoeur’s influence on literary criticism has not been as pervasive as Derrida’s, 
but his views embody a strong alternative to Derrida’s deconstructive criticism. 
Though I am concerned here with ends, I will examine what Derrida says about 
beginnings or origins because that will help us to understand what he implies 
about ends. 1 will also, at the risk o f  oversimplifying his thinking, attempt to 
put his ideas into less technical language than he uses.
For Derrida, language and meaning are based on the principle o f  difference. 
Only by distinguishing one word or concept from others can we arrive at 
understanding. Because o f  this logical requirement o f  thought and language, 
we can never discover a prior unity on which difference is based, for when we 
attempt to do so we uncover concepts that we can understand only in terms of 
their differences from other concepts. In our search for an originary unity from 
which differences arise, we discover only more differences. In our metaphysical 
ponderings, we have a concept o f  an ultimate origin as a unity prior to the
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emergence o f differences, but that concept o f  an originary source o f meaning 
and difference fades forever from us into the infinite recesses o f thought. The 
ultimate origin o f  thought is irrecoverable and therefore undefmable.
The source o f  what is prior to meaning and thought and language Derrida calls 
the trace, and the ultimate origin he sometimes calls the archetrace. This 
archetrace, however, cannot be defined or described; it is the elusive origin 
prior to thought and language. Thus, while the trace is “the origin o f  origin,” it 
is also “the disappearance o f  origin”. Since the ultimate origin is unknowable, 
it is empty o f meaning; it is “nothing”. The trace is a necessary logical 
concept, but we must also say that metaphysically speaking “there is no 
originary trace” (Derrida, 1976:61). All metaphysical theories, according to 
Derrida, are efforts to give substance to the trace, but all such efforts are finally 
ineffectual: a metaphysical description o f  the trace remains ultimately beyond 
the bounds o f  thought and language.
What Derrida says about the concept o f origins applies equally to the concept of 
ends. Just as there is no archeology o f origins that leads to an ontology of 
being, so there is no teleology o f ends that leads to an ontology o f being. We 
cannot know the ultimate end o f  thought or language just as we cannot know 
the ultimate origin. Yet because the structure o f thought and meaning is 
grounded in the structure o f time, o f  the relation o f  past, present, and future, 
we cannot escape the concern with origins and ends. The differences that make 
thought and language possible are temporal as well as spatial, and the temporal 
order therefore structures the possibilities o f thought. Thus, although the 
concepts o f origin and end which have shaped Western metaphysics are 
necessary concepts, all o f  our efforts to understand them reveal our inability to 
give them substantive meaning. Our deep human need to seek out the origins 
and ends o f  our thinking leads us only to the radical indeterminacy o f  both the 
ultimate origin and the ultimate end. We live in the middle ground o f history, 
whose beginning and ending are beyond our knowing.
In one o f  his narrative poems Robert Frost (1964) tells the story o f a married 
couple who are moving to a new farm. The husband is worried about why they 
are moving and what will happen. He wonders why they ever considered 
moving. He says to his wife,
‘I don’t want to find out what can’t be known.
But who first said the word to come?’
His wife tries to reassure him by saying:
‘My dear,
It’s who first thought the thought. You’re searching, Joe,
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For things that don’t exist; I mean beginnings.
Ends and beginnings -  there are no such things.
There are only middles.
(“In the Home Stretch”)
The poem has a kind o f Derridean irony: in our philosophies we cannot know 
beginnings and ends but only middles. Yet we cannot escape our centuries-old 
quest to tease out some knowledge o f  both origins and ends.
I will not pursue Derrida’s arguments further than this. I want now simply to 
say that on the points that I have broached I think that Derrida is right. On 
these points Derrida’s analysis should not be considered a threat to Christian 
thinking, for while Christianity celebrates the proclamation o f the Lamb who 
sits on the throne in Revelation: “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and 
the end, the first and the last” (Rev. 22:13), it does not claim to establish that 
message on the basis o f philosophical argumentation. Derrida’s demonstration 
o f the limits o f  language and the limits o f ontological argumentation does not 
undermine Christian theory but coincides with it. This is not to say that 
Derrida suddenly becomes a Christian apologist -  that is far from the truth. It 
is simply to say that the biblical revelation o f  the Lamb as Alpha and Omega is 
to be explicated from the starting point o f faith rather than o f reason. 
Christianity fills the concepts o f origin and end with the substance o f faith even 
while Enlightenment reason and Derridean theory empty them o f rationally 
grounded meaning.
But affirmations o f  faith do need to be explained and interpreted and defended. 
In this task the work o f  Paul Ricoeur provides what Charles Altieri (1990:28) 
calls a “contrastive strategy” to the strategy o f  Derrida. Ricoeur attempts to 
establish a basis for ontological thinking by considering the importance o f ends 
(or teleology) for hermeneutical philosophy. In his essay “Existence and 
hermeneutics” Ricoeur posits three concerns or movements in a philosophy of 
interpretation. The first concern focuses on origins and on psychoanalytical 
analysis o f the archeology o f desire; the second concern focuses on ends or 
purposes and on phenomenological analysis o f the teleology o f the spirit; and 
the third concern focuses on signs o f  the sacred and on the phenomenology of 
religion (Ricoeur, 1974:21). It is the second o f these concerns -  the teleological
-  that I will examine briefly.
Ricoeur assumes that an understanding o f  teleology must be based on analysis 
o f texts and is not provided directly by authorial intention. Nor is our 
understanding o f a text to be based on our own a priori beliefs about the nature 
o f existence. Texts exist independently o f authors and readers; they are thus 
distantiated from a priori or originary assumptions about meaning. An under­
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standing o f the teleology or purpose o f texts, therefore, depends on description 
and analysis o f  what is available to us in the texts we scrutinize. In this 
process, comparative studies o f  texts are important, for meanings are not self­
contained in single isolated texts. The meaning o f a single isolated text can be 
determined only if  we can interpret its relationships to things outside the text. 
Meaning and understanding are dependent on the hermeneutical process of 
interpreting these relationships. Now, Ricoeur argues, if  we make a leap from 
analysis o f  the teleology o f  texts to reflections on the teleology o f all existence, 
we would require a comparable method. Thus, philosophical reflections on the 
end or purpose o f  existence as a whole would require the interpreter 
(philosopher) to engage in comparative studies o f  cultural life, for teleology “is 
constituted only in the movement o f interpretation, which understands one 
figure through another figure” (Ricoeur, 1974:22). At the broadest level the 
understanding o f  teleology would lead to a full-scale enterprise involving the 
interpretation o f all cultural texts. Ricoeur (1974:22) writes:
It is the task of this [philosophical] hermeneutics to show that existence 
arrives at expression, at meaning, and at reflection only through the continual 
exegesis of all the signification that comes to light in the world of culture. 
Existence becomes a self -  human and adult -  only by appropriating this 
meaning, which first resides ‘outside’, in works, institutions, and cultural 
monuments in which the life of the spirit is objectified.
Completing this global task o f  interpretation is, o f  course, impossible, but 
Ricoeur is suggesting that through comparative studies o f  texts we at least have 
a means for significant reflection on origins and ends. If  ultimate origins and 
ends elude the efforts o f speculative reason, they are nevertheless important 
concepts in the interpretation o f  our literary and cultural texts.
Whereas Derrida wants to call into question all ontological descriptions of 
existence by showing that language prevents us from resolving the differences 
in our views o f origins and ends, Ricoeur wants to take one step toward the 
development o f  an ontology o f  existence by arguing that our language 
nevertheless does enable us to reflect hermeneutically on our differences. He 
writes in “Creativity in language” : “The stategy o f  metaphor [and we can add 
o f  narrative fictions and myth, i.e., literature] is heuristic fiction for the sake of 
redescribing reality. With metaphor we experience the metamorphosis o f both 
language and reality” (Ricoeur, 1978:133). Ricoeur’s full argument about how 
teleological analyses contribute to a conception o f reality (or an ontology of 
existence) is complex and is not necessary for my purpose. 1 give this glimpse 
into Ricoeur only to say that his alternative to postmodern skepticism offers a 
direction for Christian thinking in a postmodern era and also suggests that 
reflections on teleology are an important part o f  such thinking
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So much for the more abstract and philosophical contexts for our discussion of 
teleology. I return now to my effort to explore the implications o f these ideas 
for literary criticism. Christian thinking, I said earlier, is teleological but not 
utopian, for we cannot know what the distant future has in store and we cannot 
achieve an ideal social order. The fallenness (sinfulness) o f humanity is and 
always will be an inescapable condition o f human life in a Christian view of 
human history. It has become clear to most thinkers today that Christian 
theology gives no support to the Enlightenment idea o f progress that flourished 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sander Griffioen (1987:27) asserts 
in his essay The Problem o f  Progress that although we do need a theory of 
historical change and development, that theory must be freed from a false trust 
in the progress o f Western culture. In all cultures, he observes, the opposition 
between good and evil (Jerusalem and Babylon) “is all-pervasive, so as to leave 
no room for cumulative progress”. Christian teleology is not linked to the idea 
o f progress that emerged from an idealized view o f Western culture in prior 
centuries but to a set o f ethical norms and beliefs that serve to guide Christian 
believers in their unending struggle against evil. Christianity holds implicitly 
to an open-ended view o f  history. It is intent on exploring possibilities o f  living 
in a world that is historically indeterminate, that is to say, indeterminate in the 
sense that the future cannot be known and in the sense that a definitive model 
for social and historical life cannot be detailed as a specific and realizable goal. 
What Christianity offers in this voyage into the unknown future is the guidance 
o f a tradition and a coherent set o f  principles, principles that serve as 
directional signs both theoretically and practically.
This is the situation o f  all theories that are open-ended. No one lives in a 
cultural and historical vacuum, and all open-ended theories o f  history and time 
are accompanied with some conception o f experience and history. Even post­
modern skeptics who view all philosophical or religious worldviews with 
suspicion base their thinking about open-endedness on the temporal process of 
living, that is to say, experience, that is to say, history. The most common view 
o f history among those who currently subscribe to open-endedness and 
indeterminacy is that the history o f  culture is a dialectic o f  power and 
liberation, o f  oppression and the struggle against oppression. But this principle 
itself functions as a teleological criterion for understanding history. No post­
modernist as far as I am aware advocates more oppression or condemns 
movements toward liberation. There is, we may conclude, no view o f life and 
history that is not teleological. Open-endedness and indeterminacy are not 
concepts opposed to teleology, and they are not per se concepts that are 
intrinsically opposed to Christian forms o f thinking. If  there are differences 
between Christian thought and many forms o f postmodern thought, the
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differences are to be found in the definitions and ramifications o f open- 
endedness and indeterminacy, not in the concepts as such.
4. Teleology and story
In order to explore these differences, I would like to turn our attention now 
more specifically to the nature o f  stories. Stories are necessarily teleological. 
They begin with a situation within which characters must act. And since action 
moves forward in time, stories, in Frank Kermode’s happy phrase, “educe the 
forms o f  a future” (1982:83). There is in every story a sense o f  an ending, a 
point toward which the action o f  the story moves. In a good su r  the ending 
seems to be inevitable, not in the sense that only one ending is possible but in 
the sense that the actions o f the story emerge credibly from preceding actions. 
Stories, in other words, explore possibilities o f  action. At any point the action 
could go in several ways, though every action necessarily cuts off some o f the 
possiblities for future actions. Every action both closes some possibilities and 
opens others. As a story grows, we want actions to grow believeably out o f 
previous actions and situations, and we want new actions to fall within the 
range o f  believeable actions. And this pattern is the pattern o f  teleology: a 
sequencing o f  actions such that the story “educes the forms o f a future” in a way 
that is credible. At any point the ending may not be determinate or predictable 
or knowable, but it must fall within the pattern that previous actions have 
established. In all stories open-endedness and teleology are companions.
I want now to insist a little more strongly that a Christian view o f history is 
teleological in the sense that I am trying to clarify. I like to think o f history as 
an exploration o f  possibilities. It is sometimes suggested that Christians can be 
confident about whatever happens because they know how history will end, 
namely with the second coming o f Christ and the beginning o f a new heaven 
and a new earth. But the term end  is ambivalent here. We speak o f end as 
conclusion and end as purpose, and these two meanings do not always coincide. 
One concerned with the “doctrine o f  the last things” would use the term end  in 
the sense o f conclusion whereas one concerned with teleology in general would 
use the term end  in the sense o f  purpose. The second coming may be seen as 
the conclusion o f  history, but it need not be thought o f as the purpose o f  history. 
In a certain theological sense, o f  course, the eschaton might be seen as the 
purpose o f  history, that is to say, the purpose o f history is the final restoration of 
the creation order. But if  we conflate eschatology (in the narrow sense) and 
teleology (in the sense o f conclusion and purpose) and then as a consequence 
view the historical quest for a Christian life and society as a quest to emulate or 
realize the conditions o f  the “life hereafter”, we create the possibility for a kind 
o f  escapism from history, a looking beyond to something that cannot happen in 
the here and now. In a Christian view, historical life can never achieve the
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equivalent o f  the “life hereafter”, and our need for historical realism, therefore, 
should not be obscured by a Christian idealism that places undue emphasis on 
the life hereafter.
If we use the term purpose in a more realistic and specific way to refer to 
human intentions and actions, then the purpose o f  history must be understood 
in the context o f  human actions within history as a pattern or projection o f  real 
historical possibilities. Certainly Christians can speak o f  God’s purposes 
(revealed in Scripture as well as in nature and history) and o f  the end times, but 
the second coming and the life hereafter are not possibilities for life within 
history. From a human point o f  view, then, Christian teleology is concerned 
with future possibilites that are historical and therefore indeterminate and open- 
ended. A Christian view o f history does not engage in predictions or 
programmatic images o f  the future, and it does not believe that an utopian 
society is a realizable ideal. It seeks to explore possibilities o f  action in relation 
to what is known about the past. This knowledge, o f  course, for Christians, 
involves the understanding o f the past that comes through Scripture as well as 
through experience, but it is contained within and functions within the bounds 
o f  historical experience.
This teleological view o f history, we may now say, conceives o f  history as a 
story -  as the story that men and women create as they explore the possibilities 
o f  action in a world that God has made for them. The structure o f  history is the 
structure o f a story. The difference between history and the stories we tell is 
that the story o f  history is always in process, never finished. It is a story 
therefore whose final ending in a teleological sense is not and cannot be known. 
We have a “sense o f an ending” and we have a long sequence o f  previous 
actions to think about, but we do not know specifically what the state o f  human 
life will be like before the eschaton. As a matter o f  fact we cannot even project 
very far into the future.
O f course, we do try to see as far as we can into the future. As we live out the 
story o f  history, we “educe the forms o f  a ftiture” according to our best 
judgments. We envision possibilities o f  action, and our living is an exploration 
o f these possibilities. But we are left with exploration rather than certainty 
about historical possibilities. Christians can see into the immediate future no 
better than anyone else; they only look at histoiy through different glasses, as 
John Calvin intimates (1949 [ 1559:I]:80).
While this view o f teleology and history may seem less than confident about 
Christian action and judgment in the world, it is I believe a vigorous and 
hopeful application o f the doctrine o f creation. It infuses into this doctrine the 
energy o f  discovery and exploration and creativity; it welcomes participation in
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the cultures o f the world rather than denial or escape; it encourages us to 
continually create and explore new stories rather than to live as sardonic jurors 
or prosecutors o f  all stories other than our own. To explore the creation is to 
explore the possibilities that God has placed within the creation order, and to 
explore these possibilities is to explore the infinite ways for relating to and 
finding fellowship with the God o f creation. If in creation God reveals himself 
and communes with his people, then all o f  history will not be long enough to 
exhaust the possiblities for knowing this God through his creation. The finite 
can never exhaust the infinite. Thus, the open-endedness o f history is not a 
threat to Christian thinking; rather, it offers the opportunity to explore without 
end the world God gives us.
Unfortunately human beings after the fall are inclined to explore all o f the dark 
and evil possibilities as well as the possibilities for light and goodness, and 
these explorations are the material o f  literature as well as o f  life. We learn 
from stories that explore the evils within our fallen and depraved selves and 
within the fallen creation as well as from the stories that envision the 
possibilities o f  goodness. But in spite o f  the potential for evil in life and 
literature, the open-endedness o f  history may be regarded first and foremost for 
Christians as an invitation to explore the inexhaustible wonders o f  God and his 
creation.
How do stories contribute to this end? In a story we envision a situation in 
which characters act, and in following a course o f  action we are in effect 
considering the plausibility and desirability o f the characters’ choices. Stories 
imagine, or project, ways o f acting in given situations. As Wayne Booth 
(1988:71) writes in The Company We Keep, “Every appraisal o f narrative is 
implicitly a comparison between the always complex experience we have had in 
its presence and what we have known before”. We are drawn to stories because 
they enable us to reflect on possibilities o f action, and we respond to them 
favourably when they open up for us new ways o f  imagining and thinking about 
human action. The value o f  stories (literature) is in the final analysis that they 
help us to reflect on possible directions for our own actions in our own 
historical stories.
Telling stories in literature is but a sophisticated, complex, and aesthetically 
pleasing way o f doing what we all do throughout our lives. As Carr (1986:61) 
writes:
The actions and sufferings of life can be viewed as a process of telling 
ourselves stories, listening to those stories, and acting them out or living 
them through. And here I am thinking only of living one’s own life, quite
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apart from the social dimension, both cooperative and antagonistic, of our 
action, which is even more obviously intertwined with narration.
Our communications with one another consist primarily o f  the stories we tell, 
whether they narrate actual, imagined, or dreamed events, or whether they 
interpret past events. Often we tell the same story in different ways (as in a 
court o f law) so that we can decide what to think or what to do about given 
situations. But more often perhaps we store up the stories we hear so that when 
certain situations arise we can recall the stories and use them as guides for the 
decisions or actions we need to take. When it is time to act, we refer to the 
stories we have heard. How do I change a flat tire? How do I apply for a 
passport? What is the best way to catch rainbow trout? Almost all o f our 
actions are guided by our memory o f stories we have heard. And if  we are 
uncertain about what to do, we go out looking for stories from people who have 
gone through the same circumstances or have performed similar actions. What 
is the best way to travel from the U.S. to South Africa? What is it like for an 
American to spend time at an Afrikaans-speaking university? Through hearing 
the stories o f others, we envision possibilities for our own lives; from these 
stories we “educe the forms for a future”.
The stories that we call literature are not, to be sure, as immediately practical as 
the ordinary stories o f  everyday life, but their purpose and value are 
fundamentally the same. The teleology implicit in stories helps us to deal with 
the teleology o f  our own lives, not in a prescriptive way and perhaps not in 
ways that are characterized by immediate application and finality. But our 
actions and questions range from the immediacy o f  traveling to a new place to 
the broad issues o f  relating to other people, to nature, and to God. Somewhere 
in the range o f these actions and questions stories speak to us, offering 
possibilities for thinking and acting in our own situations. Consciously or not, 
we are in effect asking the following question: Given these stories, what are the 
possible and desirable ways o f  acting in similar situations?
The stories we tell and hear do not, o f course, “move” us to action in the way 
that Sir Philip Sidney believed (1991:123). That assumption is the basic fallacy 
o f Sidney’s position. If  stories really did compel or determine actions, then, 
like Sidney, we would have to be very much concerned about developing and 
praising only those stories that promote virtue. But stories offer possibilities, 
not directives. Through the telling o f stories we envision possibilities for 
action, and through the comparisons we make among stories we gain insight 
into our own stories.
If we think about stories in this way, a way that brings together the teleology of 
stories and the teleology o f  our own lives in history, a way o f viewing the ethics
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o f literary study is evident. The end o f  literature is not the discovery of 
universal moral truths and values; it is the exploration o f possible ways of 
acting in historically specific situations.
5. Implications for Christian literary theory
The implications o f this view need to be drawn out a bit further for a Christian 
theory o f literature. And so I conclude with three points.
First, Christian readers can be as open as anyone else to all stories. This point 
can be put even more emphatically: Christians need to be open to all stories 
because they are engaged in exploring the possibilities o f living in history. To 
read and imaginatively empathize with nonchristian stories is important, 
because in order to develop and enrich their own stories, Christians need to 
know and reflect on all the stories that human beings imagine. This openness 
is also important because Christians need to listen to and assess the stories of 
others. All human beings participate in constant cultural interactions with 
other members o f  society, and critical evaluations o f  and responses to literature 
are o f  value only if  readers are truly hearing and understanding the stories they 
encounter.
Second, if  stories serve the ends that I have been discussing, then it is important 
for a Christian critic to think religiously about stories and, even more strongly, 
to let religious thinking be the basis for literary judgments. If stories grow out 
o f  experiences in real life and if  they serve the purpose o f “educing the forms of 
a future”, they are contained within the larger story o f  history. At the end o f  his 
novel A ll the K in g ’s Men, Robert Penn Warren (1959:438) writes that Jack 
Burden and Anne Stanton, now married, go “out o f  history into history and the 
awful responsibility o f  Time”. The burden o f  all stories is that they create 
situations and characters out o f  the materials o f life (history) and project 
possibilities for acting that are relevant to our own exploration o f  life. The 
study and evaluation o f literature cannot at its most significant point be 
separated from the responsibilities o f  time. And since for the Christian critic 
the perspective on history and the responsibilities o f  time are profoundly 
religious, the ultimate framework for literary understanding, too, is the 
religious perspective o f Christian faith. Even though propositional truth may 
not be the primary end o f  literature, Christian literary critics need to be 
religiously and theologically astute, since the religious story is the large story of 
history within which our smaller stories occur. As Hans Frei (1974:130) 
argues, our stories must fit into the world that the Bible describes. The way we 
interpret our smaller stories is dependent on how we interpret the larger one. 
The smaller stories also o f  course influence how we think about the larger one,
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but it is still the case that we do not understand our smaller literary stories apart 
from our understanding o f the larger religious one.
Third, though I have been advocating and offering a basis for the Christian 
critic’s concern with religious and ethical values in the study o f literature, I 
have attempted to avoid dogmatism and censorship. These two weaknesses in 
what passes for Christian criticism grow out o f  and imply a closed view of 
history, a view that wants to believe that universal Christian values can be fully 
packaged and accompanied with a set o f  easy instructions for use. I hope that 
these reflections on the end or teleology o f  literature on the one hand offer a 
basis for being open in the fullest sense to the reading and study o f  literature 
and on the other hand reveal the need for doing literary criticism within the 
bounds o f  religion (cf., Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds o f  Religion -  
1976). To paraphrase (and reverse the thought of) Matthew Arnold’s 
(1991:358-59) famous statement about literature and religion: We may need to 
think o f  Christian literary criticism more worthily than we have done so far, fo r  
more and more people should discover that we have to turn to religion to 
interpret life and literature fo r  us. Without religion, our literary criticism will 
seem to be incomplete. Literary criticism as we know it can be enriched and 
made more useful by a truly Christian criticism.
A Christian criticism that is principial and internally coherent needs a theory 
that accounts for the relationship o f  literature to life; and that points, among 
other things, to the need to rethink the nature and implications o f  teleology as a 
historical and ethical concept. The need is for an ethical criticism that is based 
on a teleological understanding o f historical life. The challenge for Christian 
critics is to acknowledge the contributions o f postmodern thinkers to the 
philosophical debates about time and history, language and rationality, truth 
and ethics, while at the same time maintaining the coherence o f a historical 
Christianity. To do that may require a refurbished understanding o f history and 
ethics and an exploration o f how that understanding can refocus the aims of 
Christian literary criticism.
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